Productivity shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy in a Unionized Labor Market Economy by Mattesini, Fabrizio & Rossi, Lorenza
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Productivity shocks and Optimal
Monetary Policy in a Unionized Labor
Market Economy
Fabrizio Mattesini and Lorenza Rossi
Universita` di Roma ”Tor Vergata”
June 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2828/
MPRA Paper No. 2828, posted 19. April 2007
Productivity shocks and Optimal Monetary
Policy in a Unionized Labor Market Economy
Fabrizio Mattesini
Università di Roma Tor Vergata
Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma, It
Lorenza Rossi
Istituto di Economia e nanza
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Via Necchi, 5 - 20123 - Milano, It
EABCN
April 2007
Abstract
In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium dynamic stochastic
New Keynesian model characterized by labor indivisibilities, unem-
ployment and a unionized labor market. The presence of monopoly
unions introduces real wage rigidities in the model. We show that as in
Blanchard Galì (2005) the so called divine coincidencedoes not hold
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and a trade-o¤ between ination stabilization and the output stabi-
lization arises. In particular, a productivity shock has a negative e¤ect
on ination, while a reservation-wage shock has an e¤ect of the same
size but with the opposite sign. We derive a welfare-based objective
function for the Central Bank as a second order Taylor approxima-
tion of the expected utility of the economys representative household,
and we analyze optimal monetary policy under discretion and under
commitment. Under discretion a negative productivity shock and a
positive exogenous wage shock will require an increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate. An operational instrument rule, in this case, will
satisfy the Taylor principle, but will also require that the nominal in-
terest rate does not necessarily respond one to one to an increase in
the interest rate that supports the e¢ cient equilibrium. The results
of the model are consistent with a well known empirical regularity in
macroeconomics, i.e. that employment volatility is relatively larger
than real wage volatility.
JEL codes: E24, E32, E50, J23, J51
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1 Introduction
In the last ten years, the Dynamic Stochastic New Keynesian (henceforth,
DSNK) model has emerged as an important paradigm in macroeconomics
and as a useful framework for the study of monetary policy. Most of the
models proposed so far along this line of research, however, are based on the
standard competitive model and completely ignore the role that trade unions
play in determining wages and employment conditions in many countries. If
this is probably an acceptable (although very strong) simplication for coun-
tries, like the U.S., where in the year 2002, only about 15% of workers were
covered by collective contract agreements, it becomes instead problematic
for other countries such as France, Italy or Sweden where the percentage of
workers covered by collective contracts is above 84%.1 Given that wage bar-
gaining may introduce signicant distortions in the functioning of a modern
economy and have an impact on its behavior at the aggregate level, the study
of unionized labor markets and of the consequences of these markets for mon-
etary policy becomes of crucial importance if one wants to understand the
functioning of many important economies around the world.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model where wages are the result
of a contractual process between unions and rms and where, at the same
time, the movements of the rate of unemployment are explicitly accounted
for. In order to evaluate movements of labor along the extensive margin, we
assume, as in Hansen [22] and Rogerson and Wright [30], that labor supply is
1More precisely, the number of persons covered by collective agreeements over total
employment was 94.5% in France in 2003, 84.1% in Italy in the year 2000 and 85.1% in
Sweden in the year 2000. For a complete set of data on union coverage on the various
countries see Lawrence and Ishikawa [24].
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indivisible and that workers face a positive probability to remain unemployed.
As in Ma¤ezzoli [25] and Zanetti [38], we assume that wages are set by unions
according to the popular monopoly-union model introduced by Dunlop [12]
and Oswald [27]. This paper, therefore, contributes to a literature which has
recently tried to improve on the standardDSNK model by focusing on the
behavior of the labor market. Models characterized by labor market frictions
and price staggering, where labor is allowed to move not only along the
intensive margin but also the extensive margin, have been proposed, among
others, by Chéron and Langot [7], Walsh [34] [35], Trigari [32], [33], Moyen
and Sahuc [26] and Andres et al. [2]. More recently Christo¤el and Linzert [9]
and Blanchard and Galì [4] [5] have proposed models characterized not only
by labor market frictions and staggered prices, but also by real wage rigidities.
Blanchard and Galì [4] show that, if real wages are assumed to adjust slowly,
what they dene as the divine coincidencedoes not hold any more: for a
central bank pursuing, as a policy objective, the level of output that would
prevail under exible prices is not equivalent to pursuing the e¢ cient level of
output, in which case a trade-o¤ between ination stabilization and output
gap stabilization arises. Blanchard and Galì [5] analyze a model where labor
market frictions are not simply assumed but explicitly modelled and show
that a policy trade-o¤ does not only pertain to the output gap, but also to
the rate of unemployment.
Also in the model we propose here, as in Blanchard and Galì, [4] [5]
the divine coincidencedoes not hold, and changes in unemployment are
explicitly modeled. Di¤erently from the existing literature, however, instead
of basing the analysis on the Pissarides [28] model of search and matching, we
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introduce unemployment in an alternative simple and tractable way which
allows us to establish an inverse relationship between unemployment and
the output gap and we focus on the consequences of union behavior for
the response of the economy to exogenous shocks. The model is capable of
producing a series of interesting results.
First, it shows that productivity shocks give rise to a signicant policy
trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and stabilizing unemployment, and in
this respect it provides a way to overcome an important shortcoming of the
DSNK model, i.e. its inability to account for the signicant challenges that
exogenous changes in technology represent for monetary policy in the real
world. According to the standardDSNK model, in fact, an optimal mon-
etary policy that stabilizes output around its exible price equilibrium, also
produces zero ination,2 so that stabilizing ination implies automatically
an optimal response to a productivity shocks. This, however, not only is
at odds with the historical accounts3 and the widespread perception of -
nancial markets, but there is also some recent empirical evidence indicating
that, in most countries, central banks have actively responded to technology
shocks, increasing or decreasing the nominal interest rate.4 What is interest-
2This is shown quite clearly, for example, by Galì, Lopez Salido and Valles [16].
3In this respect the debate on the Feds monetary policy during governor Greenspan
tenure is quite instructive. There is a lot of anectodical evidence that the Fed has spent
large e¤orts in understanding the increase in productivity growth that has characterized
the American economy since the mid 1990s. The success of monetary policy in this period
has been attributed by important commentators (Woodward 2000) to the ability of the
Fed to respond to exogenous technological progress.
4Galì et al. [15], analyzing a 4 variable SVAR model where thechnology shocks were
identied by assuming a unit root in labor productivity, found that the Fed, in the post-
Volcker period, di not change the nominal interest rate in response to productivity shocks,
but in a recent paper, Francis, Owyang and Theodoru [14] used the same methodology
to analyze monetary policy for the G7 countries and found a wide range of variation
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ing, in our model, is that this result is not the consequence of some kind of
exogenous real wage inertia, as in Blanchard and Galì [4], but is simply the
consequence of unionsmonopoly power in the labor market. In our economy,
in fact, a productivity slowdown, i.e. a negative productivity shock tends to
lower e¢ cient output but, since unions will keep real wages constant, the
level of output that would prevail under price exibility, that we dene as
natural output, decreases even more, so that the di¤erence between e¢ -
cient output and natural output increases. Since in sticky price models
ination depends on marginal costs and, in turn, marginal costs depend on
the di¤erence between naturaloutput and actual output, then a Phillips
curve, correctly dened as depending on the gap between e¢ cient output and
actual output, will depend on productivity shocks, and a trade-o¤ between
ination stabilization and output gap stabilization arises.
Second, we show that a policy trade-o¤ for the central bank arises not
only in response to technology shocks, but also in response to exogenous wage
push shocks. If the unionsreservation wage is subject to exogenous changes,
and these changes tend to be persistent over time, then a welfare maximiz-
ing central bank must again face the problem of whether to accommodate
these shocks with a easier monetary policy. Our model therefore provides
a convenient framework to address important normative issues such as, for
example, the optimal behavior of central banks in periods characterized by
in the behavior of di¤erent countries: while France, Japan, the United Kingdom (after
the break in monetary regime) seem to have reacted to a technology shock by increasing
nominal interest rates, the U.S. (before and after Vocker), Canada, Germany, the U.K
(pre-break) and Italy, seem to have reacted instead by lowering interest rates. A policy of
no-reaction to a productivity shock consistent with the prescriptions of the standard DNK
model, therefore, does not seem to have been widely adopted by the major industrialized
countries.
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labor market turmoil and exogenous wage shocks.
Third, we derive the objective function of the central bank as a second
order Taylor approximation of the expected utility of the representative
household and we show that, when the economy is hit by technology and ex-
ogenous wage shocks, monetary policy presents some interesting peculiarities
relative to the standard case. We rst consider the problem of a central bank
that cannot commit to future policy actions. In this case optimal monetary
policy requires a decrease (increase) in the interest rate following a positive
(negative) productivity shock and an increase in the interest rate following
a reservation wage shock. An optimal instrument rule that implements such
policy can be expressed as an interest rate reacting to the expected rate of
ination and to the natural rate of interest. In this model monetary policy
satises the Taylor principle, i.e. the nominal interest rate must be raised
more than proportionally with respect to the expected rate of ination. Dif-
ferently from the standard model, however, the nominal interest rate must
not increase one to one with the natural rate of interest. If the persistence
of the technological shock is greater than the persistence of the reservation
wage shock the nominal interest will increase less than proportionately to an
increase in the rate of interest that supports the e¢ cient equilibrium.
A fourth, important result is that the model is able to account for a well
known stylized fact in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth behavior of
wages and the relatively volatile behavior of unemployment over the business
cycle. When the level of unemployment that the economy achieves under an
optimal discretionary policy is written as a function of the relevant shocks,
an exogenous wage shock will in general induce a movement both in the
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real wage and in the rate of unemployment; a productivity shock, instead,
will induce a movement in the rate of unemployment, but not in the real
wage. An economy frequently hit by exogenous changes in technology will
show, therefore, a strong variability in the rate of unemployment without
experiencing, at the same time, signicant movements in the real wage.5
The model is calibrated not only under the optimal rule, but also un-
der other simpler operational rules. We show that an optimal discretionary
monetary policy requires a reaction to ination which is less aggressive than
the one required by strict ination targeting, but more aggressive than the
one required by a policy of full employment stabilization. We also show that
an optimal monetary policy may be replicated by a simple Taylor rule. A
rule that is capable to deliver impulse response functions similar to the ones
implied by the optimal rule, however, implies that the reaction to ination
is quite high relative to the most popular estimates, and a smaller reaction
to the output gap.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by introducing
indivisible labor in a standard DSNK model with Walrasian labor markets.
In Section 3 we develop the unionized labor market model. In Section 4
we study optimal monetary policy and, nally, in Section 4 we calibrate the
model under the optimal rule and some simpler policy rules.
5Also Gertler and Trigari [19] propose a model where wages and unemployment move
consistently with the observed data. They achieve this result, however, by introducing
exogenous multiperiod wage contracts.
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2 A model with Indivisible Labor and Wal-
rasian Labor Market
2.1 The Representative Household
We consider an economy populated by many identical, innitely lived worker-
households each of measure zero. Households demand a Dixit, Stiglitz [11]
composite consumption bundle produced by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms. In each period households sell labor services to the rms.
As in Hansen [22], Rogerson [30] and Rogerson and Wright [31], for each
household the alternative is between working a xed number of hours and
not working at all. We assume that agents enter employment lotteries, i.e.
sign, with a rm, a contract that commits them to work a xed number of
hours, that we normalize to one, with probability Nt: The contract itself is
being traded, so a household gets paid whether it works or not which implies
that the rm is providing complete unemployment insurance to the workers.
Since all households are identical, all will choose the same contract, i.e. the
same Nt: However, although households are ex-ante identical, they will dif-
fer ex-post depending on the outcome of the lottery: a fraction Nt of the
continuum of households will work and the rest 1 Nt remains unemployed.
The allocation of individuals to work or leisure is determined completely at
random by a lottery, and lottery outcomes are independent over time.
Before the lottery draw, the expected intratemporal utility function is:
1
1  Nt [C0;t (0)]
1  +
1
1   (1 Nt) [C1;t (1)]
1  (1)
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where C0;t is the consumption level of employed individuals, C1;t is the con-
sumption of unemployed individuals, Nt is the ex-ante probability of being
employed and  () is the utility of leisure. Since the utility of leisure of em-
ployed individuals  (0) and the utility of leisure of unemployed individuals
 (1) are positive constants, we assume  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1: As in King
and Rebelo [21], we assume 0 < 1:
If asset market are complete, households can insure themselves against the
risk of being unemployed. Under perfect risk sharing we have:
C 0;t 
1 
0 = C
 
1;t 
1 
1 (2)
which implies that the marginal utilities of consumption are equal for em-
ployed and unemployed individuals. Dening the average consumption level
as:
Ct = NtC0;t + (1 Nt)C1;t
and given (2), equation (1) can be rewritten as:
1
1  C
1 
t
h
Nt
1 

0 + (1 Nt) 
1 

1
i
: (3)
This allows us to write the life-time expected intertemporal utility function
of a representative household as:
Ut = Et
1X
=t
 t
1
1   [Ct (Nt)]
1  ; (4)
where  > 1; and 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount rate and where the
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function
 (Nt) =
h
Nt
1 

0 + (1 Nt) 
1 

1
i 
1 
can be interpreted as the disutility of employment for the representative
household. The elasticity of  (Nt) with respect to its argument is given
by  =
N (Nt)
(Nt)
N < 0. The ow budget constraint of the representative
household is given by:
PtCt + P
 1
t Bt+1  WtNt +Bt +t   Tt (5)
where Pt is the corresponding consumption price index (CPI) and Wt is the
wage rate. Notice that here a worker is paid according to the probability
that it works, not according to the work it does; in other words, the rm is
automatically providing full employment insurance to the households. The
purchase of consumption goods, Ct; is nanced by labor income, prot in-
come t; and a lump-sum transfers Tt from the Government. Households
have access to a nancial market, where nominal bonds are exchanged. We
denote by Bt the quantity of nominally riskless one period bonds carried over
from period t   1; and paying one unit of the numéraire in period t. The
maximization of (4) subject to (5) gives the following::
1 = RtEt
"
Ct+1
Ct
  
 (Nt)
 (Nt+1)
1 
Pt
Pt+1
#
(6)
Wt
Pt
=  CtN (Nt)
 (Nt)
(7)
where equation (6) is the standard consumption Euler equation and (7) gives
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us the supply of labor of the representative household.
2.2 The Representative Finished Goods-Producing Firm
The representative nished goods-producing rm uses Yt (j) units of each
intermediate good j 2 [0; 1] purchased at a nominal price Pt (j) to produce
Yt units of the nished good with the constant returns to scale technology:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(8)
where  is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Prot
maximization yields the following set of demands for intermediate goods:
Yt (j) =

Pt (j)
Pt
 
Yt (9)
Perfect competition and free entry drives the nished good-producing rms
prots to zero, so that from the zero prot condition we obtain:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (j)
1 
 1
1 
: (10)
which denes the aggregate price index of our economy.
2.3 The Representative intermediate Goods-Producing
Firm
We abstract from capital accumulation and assume that there is a contin-
uum of intermediate good-producing rms j 2 (0; 1) which hire Nt units
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of labor from the representative household and produce Yt (j) units of the
intermediate good using the following technology:
Yt (j) = AtNt (j)
 (11)
where At is an exogenous productivity shock. We assume that the lnAt 
at follows follows the autoregressive process
at = aat 1 + a^t (12)
where a < 1 and a^t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation a.
Before choosing the price of its goods, a rm chooses the level of Nt (j) which
minimizes its costs, solving the following costs minimization problem:
min
fNtg
TCt = (1  )WtNt (j)
subject to (11), where  represents an employment subsidy to the rm6. The
rst order condition with respect to Nt (j) is given by:
(1  )Wt
Pt
=MCt (j)
Yt (j)
Nt (j)
; (13)
where MCt (j) represents rms j marginal costs. Dening aggregate mar-
6We assume that the subsidy is covered by a lump sum tax in that the Government
runs always a balanced budget.
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ginal costs as:
MCt =
(1  )

Wt
Pt
Nt
Yt
: (14)
2.4 Market clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j requires that the production of
the nal good be allocated to expenditure, as follows:
Yt (j) = Ct (j) (15)
considering (8) then
Yt = Ct (16)
which represents the economy resource constraint.
Since the net supply of bonds, in equilibrium is zero, equilibrium in the bonds
market, instead, implies
Bt = 0: (17)
Labor market clearing implies
Nt =
Z 1
0
Nt (j) dj (18)
given equation (9), (11) and (18) the aggregate production function can be
expressed as
DtYt = AtN

t (19)
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where
Dt =
"Z 1
0

Pt (j)
Pt
  

dj
#
(20)
is a measure of price dispersion.
Dening as X the steady state value of a generic variable Xt and by
xt = lnXt   lnX the log-deviation of the variable from its steady state
value, then a linear rst order approximation of the resource constrained
around the steady state is given by:
yt = ct (21)
Given that in a neighborhood of a symmetric equilibrium and up to a rst
order approximation Dt ' 1; log-linearizing equation (19) we obtain,
yt = at + nt: (22)
2.5 The First Best Level of Output
The e¢ cient level of output can be obtained by solving the problem of a
benevolent planner that maximizes the intertemporal utility of the repre-
sentative household, subject to the resource constraint and the production
function. This problem is analyzed in the Appendix A1, where we show that
the e¢ cient supply of labor, in our economy, is given by:
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
Nt =  : (23)
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Log-linearizing (23), and considering (22), we obtain7
yEfft = at: (24)
2.6 The Flexible Price Equilibrium and the Natural
Output
Equilibrium in the labor market is obtained by equating (7) and (14). Sub-
stituting (16), this implies
 YtN (Nt)
 (Nt)
=
1
(1  )MCt
Yt
Nt
(25)
Under exible prices, all rms set their prices equal to a constant markup
over marginal cost. Assuming that rms mark-up, Pt is constant, under
the exible price-equilibrium rms real marginal costs are constant at their
steady state level and therefore given by:
MCt =
1
1 + P
: (26)
Considering now the log-linearization of (25) we obtain8,
mct =

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

nt (27)
Considering that mct = 0;then nt = 0 and, from the aggregate production
7See appendix A2.
8See appendix A3.
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function, we have that under the exible price equilibrium:
yft = at: (28)
Taking the di¤erence between the log-linearized exible and e¢ cient output
we obtain:
yEfft   yft = 0 (29)
As in the standard DSNK model, when labor market is frictionless the dif-
ference between the e¢ cient output (its rst best) coincides with its exible
price equilibrium level (its second best) that we have dened as the natural
level of output.9 In other words, what Blanchard and Galì [4] call the di-
vine coincidencewill hold, since any policy that stabilizes output around
its natural level, will stabilize it also around its e¢ cient level. Notice that,
in this model we have left the subsidy  as parametric in order to show that
the divine coincidence holds for any possible value of the subsidy. As in the
standard case, also in this model an optimal subsidy could be set in order to
eliminate the constant distortion induced by monopolistic competition.
9Our result is equivalent to the one of Blanchard Galì, where they consider (log) real
marginal costs instead of log-deviation from the steady state, and therefore the di¤erence
between the e¢ cient and the exible price output is constant and not zero.
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2.7 The Phillips Curve
Firms choose Pt (j) in a staggered price setting à la Calvo-Yun [6]. In the
appendix A4 we show that, in our decreasing return to scale economy, the
solution of the rms problem is given by:
t = Ett+1 + mct (30)
where  =
(1  )(1  )
 

+(1 ) and  is the probability with which rms
reset prices.
Given (22), (27) and (28), marginal costs can be rewritten in terms of the
gap between actual and natural output,
mct =

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

yt   yft

(31)
so that, equation (30) can be rewritten as,
t = Ett+1 + a

1 +
N (N)
 (N)
N   NN (N)N
2
 (N)

xt (32)
where a =
(1 ')(1 ')
'

+(1 ) and
xt = yt   yft (33)
is the output gap with respect to the natural rate of output. As in the
standard case there is no trade-o¤ between output stabilization and ination
stabilization, since a central bank that sets ination to zero will immediately
stabilize output.
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3 Amodel with Indivisible Labor and a Union-
ized Labor Market
3.1 The Monopoly Union
As in the previous subsection the individual labor supply is indivisible. Each
rm is endowed with a pool of household from which it can hire. In fact, as in
Ma¤ezzoli [25] and Zanetti [38], rms hire workers from a pool composed of
innitely many households so that the individual household member is again
of measure zero. Since each household supplies its labor to only one rm,
which can be clearly identied, workers try to extract some producer surplus
by organizing themselves into a rm-specic trade union. The economy is
populated by decentralized trade unions, so that each intermediate goods-
producing rm negotiate with a single union i 2 (0; 1) ; which is too small to
inuence the outcome of the market. Unions negotiate the wage on behalf of
their members.
The denition of the a unions objective function has been, in the past, the
object of much controversy in labor economics and, as thoroughly discussed
by Farber [13], there is no consensus on the appropriate microfoundation
of this function. In this paper we choose to follow the approach proposed
by Ma¤ezzoli [25], who has recently analyzed the consequences of unionized
wage setting in the RBC model. We assume that, consistently with the
well-known monopoly union model introduced by Dunlop [12] and Oswald
[27], the union chooses the nominal wage rate that maximizes the following
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welfare function10:
Nt (i)
Wt
Pt
+ (1 Nt (i))W
r
t
Pt
(34)
subject to rms labor demand (13), where, W rt is the reservation wage.
The reservation wage, here, is not a direct aggregation of workers reserva-
tion wages, but rather reects the subjective evaluation, by union leaders of
workersdisutility of labor.11 With equation (34) we assume that unions
are risk neutral and maximize members average wage. We assume that the
reservation wage follows a stochastic process. Denoting by wrt the logarithm
of W rt we assume that:
wrt = ww
r
t 1 + w^
r
t (35)
where w < 1 and w
r
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innova-
tion with zero mean and standard deviation w.
The employment rate and the wage rate are determined in a non-cooperative
dynamic game between the unions and the rms. We restrict the attention
to Markov strategies, so that in each period union and rm solve a sequence
of independent static games. Each union behaves as a Stackelberg leader and
each rm as a Stackelberg follower. Once the wage has been chosen, each
rm decides the employment rate along its labor demand function. Even if
unions are large at the rm level, they are small at the economy level, and
therefore they take the aggregate wage as given. The ex-ante probability of
10The utility function above correspondes to the risk neutral analogue of the utilitarian
utility function of Oswald [27]. Anderson and Devereux [1] and Pissarides [29] use a similar
utility function.
11In principle the reservation wage could also represent any unemployment subsidy
provided by the government. In this model however, workers insure themselves against
unemployment, and therefore these subsidies do not have any reason to exist.
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being employed is equal to the aggregate employment rate and the allocation
of union members to work or leisure is completely random and independent
over time.
From the rst order conditions of the unions maximization problem with
respect to Wt (i) we have:
Wt (i)
Pt
=
1

W rt
Pt
: (36)
Since 1

> 1; this implies that the real wage rate is always set above the
reservation wage.
3.2 Households
Similarly to what happens in the previous model, also in this case households
enter employment lotteries i.e. sign, with a rm, a contract that commits
them to work a xed number of hours with probability Nt: By entering this
contract, which is being traded, a rm provides complete unemployment
insurance to the workers.12 As in the previous model, also in this model
the marginal utility of consumption will be equalized across employed and
unemployed workers, so that households can be aggregated in a representative
household. Therefore, also in this model the life-time expected intertemporal
utility function of a representative household can be written again as the
problem of maximizing (4) subject to (??) and the ow budget constraint
(5).
12Alternatively, we could consider an institutional arrangement where the union o¤ers
actuarally fair insurance contracts, redistributing income between employed and unem-
ployed workers.
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The model is quite similar to the previous model with walrasian labor
markets, except for the fact that now households, in solving their problem,
take Nt as given, since the supply of labor is determined by the maximization
problem of the monopoly union. The maximization of utility function subject
to budget constraint gives the same Euler equation as in theWalrasian model,
which is given by equation (6).
3.3 The Flexible Price Equilibrium and the Natural
Level of Output
Given that both intermediate goods and nished goods producing rm prob-
lem are the same as in the previous problem, the aggregate labor demand
function is again given by equation (14). Equating (14) and (36), we obtain:
1

W rt
Pt
=
1
(1  )MCt
Yt
Nt
: (37)
Since under exible prices all rms set their prices as a constant markup over
marginal costs, which is given by equation (26), we can rewrite equation (37)
as:
1

W rt
Pt
=
1
(1  )
1
1 + P
Yt
Nt
(38)
Considering now the log-linearization of (37) we obtain the following expres-
sion for real marginal costs
mct = nt   yt + wrt (39)
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where wrt is the logarithm of the real reservation wage. Solving (22) for nt
and substituting in (39), we get:
mct = w
r
t +
1  

yt   1

at (40)
Considering that mct = 0; substituting in (40) and solving for yt we nd
an expression for the exible-price level of output, which we dene as the
natural rate of output for our unionized economy:
yft =
1
1  at  

1  w
r
t (41)
Recalling now that the e¢ cient level of output, for our economy with indivis-
ible labor, is given by equation (24) we immediately see that the di¤erence
between natural output and e¢ cient output of the unionized economy is
given by
yEfft   yft =  

1  at +

1  w
r
t : (42)
Unlike what happens in the walrasian model, this di¤erence is not constant,
but is a function of the relevant shocks that hit the economy. In this model
therefore, as in Blanchard and Galì [4] stabilizing the output gap - the di¤er-
ence between actual and natural output - is not equivalent to stabilizing the
welfare relevant output gap - the gap between actual and e¢ cient output.
In other words, what Blanchard and Galì call the divine coincidencewill
not hold, since any policy that brings the economy to its natural level is not
necessarily an optimal policy.
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3.4 The Long Run Labor Market Equilibrium: Opti-
mal Subsidy
In this economy, when rms can revise their price at each time, beside the
distortion created by monopolistic competition and rmsmarkup we have a
distortion created by the monopoly union wage setting. We assume that, at
the steady state, the government uses the employment subsidy to the rms
 , to bring steady state output to its e¢ cient level, i.e. to the level at which
N (N)
 (N)
N =  : (43)
Since in the unionized economy labor market equilibrium is given by:
1

W r
P
=
1
(1  )
1
1 + P
Y
N
; (44)
if the government sets a subsidy such that
 W
r
P
(1  ) (1 + P )N
Y
=
N (N)
 (N)
N (45)
which implies
  =

1 +
1
1 + P

N (N)
 (N)
N
Y
N
P
W r

: (46)
then conditions (43) and (44) coincide.
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3.5 The IS-Curve
In order to obtain the IS curve we start by log-linearizing around the steady
state the Euler equation (6). Considering that in steady state the optimal
subsidy setting implies N (N)N
(N)
=  ; the log-linearized Euler equation is
given by:
ct = Et fct+1g+  (1  )

Et fnt+1g   1

(r^t   Et ft+1g) : (47)
with r^t = rt  %; where rt = lnRt and % =   ln  which is the steady state
interest rate all the variables without a subscript are taken at their steady
state levels. Given the economy resource constraint (21) and the production
function (22), the Euler equation (47) can be written as:
yt = Et fyt+1g   (1  )Et fat+1g   (rt   Et ft+1g) (48)
which represents the IS equation of our simple economy.
Let us redene, for the Unionized economy, the relevant output gap as the
di¤erence between actual output and e¢ cient output, i.e.,
xt = yt   yEfft : (49)
In this case the IS equation can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as,
xt = Et fxt+1g   (rt   Et ft+1g   ret ) : (50)
where r^et is the rate of interest that supports the e¢ cient allocation, which
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can be expressed as:
r^et = Et fat+1g = Et
n
yEfft+1
o
=   (1  a) at: (51)
Note that (50) expressed in terms of the gap between the actual and the
e¢ cient output relates the output gap to current and anticipated deviations
of the real interest rate from its e¢ cient counterpart.
3.6 The Phillips Curve
As in the Walrasian case, rms choose Pt (j) in a staggered price setting à la
Calvo-Yun [6] and the Phillips curve is again given by (30).
Given (39) and (41), marginal costs can be rewritten in terms of the gap
between actual output and its natural level,
mct =
1  


yt   yft

(52)
so that, equation (30) can now be rewritten as,
t = Ett+1 + a
1  


yt   yft

(53)
Given the relationship between e¢ cient and natural output, (see eq. (42)),
equation (53) can nally be expressed as:
t = Ett+1 + a
1  

xt   at + wrt (54)
where xt is the output gap with respect to the e¢ cient natural rate of output.
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We can now state:
Result 1. In a unionized labor market economy the divine coincidence
does not hold, i.e., stabilizing ination is not equivalent to stabilizing the
output gap dened as the deviation of output from the e¢ cient output. A
positive (negative) productivity shock has a negative (positive) e¤ect on in-
ation, while a cost push shock has an e¤ect of the same size but with the
opposite sign on ination.
This result depends on the existence of a real distortion in the economy,
beside the one induced by monopolistic competition, and the nominal dis-
tortion caused by rmsstaggered price setting. When a productivity shock
hits the economy, e¢ cient output, given by equation (24), increases by the
same amount. Natural output instead (i.e., the level of output that would
prevail in a exible price equilibrium) increases more than proportionally so
that the di¤erence between e¢ cient output and natural output decreases.
This is due to the fact that in a unionized economy, following a productivity
shock, real wages remain constant and therefore do not o¤set the e¤ects of
the shock on real marginal cost (see equation (52)).
Because of staggered price adjustment we know that ination is proportional
to real marginal costs which, in turn, because of monopolistic competition
(see equation (53)) are proportional to the di¤erence between actual and
natural output. As we will see in the following paragraphs, a Central Bank
pursuing an optimal monetary policy will decide to stabilize the distance
between output and its e¢ cient level. If the di¤erence between e¢ cient and
exible output were constant, as in the standard model with Walrasian labor
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markets, stabilizing the gap between actual and natural output would be
equivalent to stabilizing the gap between actual and e¢ cient output. In this
case stabilizing the output gap with respect to the natural output would
be su¢ cient to stabilize ination. In our unionized economy, instead, the
natural level of output di¤ers from the e¢ cient level because of productivity
and cost-push shocks. As it is evident from equation (54), if the Central
Bank stabilizes output around the e¢ cient level, ination will be completely
vulnerable to productivity and cost-push shocks; in other words the output
gap is no longer a su¢ cient statistics for the e¤ect of real activity on ination.
One interesting aspect of this model is that we are able to express the Phillips
curve in its more traditional form, i.e. in terms of unemployment. From
equations (22), (24) and (49) we obtain in fact that
nt =
xt

(55)
Expressing the rate of unemployment as Ut = 1   Nt and log linearizing
around the steady state we obtain
ut =   

xt (56)
where  = N
1 N : We can therefore rewrite the Philllips curve as
t = Ett+1   a(1  )

ut   aat + awrt : (57)
The relationship between unemployment and the output gap that we nd in
this model, therefore, allows us to consider, indi¤erently, the output gap and
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the unemployment rate as policy objectives for the central bank.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In the appendix A5 we show that also for the non-separable preferences
assumed in our framework, consumersutility can be approximated up to
the second order by a quadratic equation of the kind:
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY;t
2
Et
1X
t=0

2t+k +
a

x2t+k

+  kk3 (58)
where ~Ut+k = Ut+k  Ut+k is the deviation of consumersutility from the level
achievable in the frictionless equilibrium, and  is the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods, which are used as input in the nal good sector.
Notice that, the relative weights assigned to ination and to the output gap
are linked to the structural parameters reecting preferences and technology.
4.1 Discretion
If the Central Bank cannot credibly commit in advance to a future policy
action or a sequence of future policy actions, then the optimal monetary
policy is discretionary, in the sense that the policy makers choose in each
period the value to assign to the policy instrument, that here we assume to
be the short-term nominal interest rate r^t. In order to do so, the Central
Bank maximizes the welfare-based loss function (58), subject to the Phillips
curve (54), taking all expectations as given.
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The rst order conditions imply:
xt =  1  

t: (59)
Substituting into (54) and iterating forward, we obtain:
t =  a


Et
1X
i=0




i  
at+i   wrt+i

(60)
where 
 = 1 + a
 
1 

2
:
Given that,
Et fat+i+1g = iaat and Et

wrt+i+1
	
= iww
r
t
and that 


< 1; under the optimal time consistent policy equation (60) can
be rewritten as,
t =   a

  a
at +
a

  w
wrt (61)
which in t+ 1 implies,
Ett+1 =   aa

  a
at +
aw

  w
wrt (62)
Notice that we can express current ination as a function of the relevant
shocks at and wrt . A positive productivity shock requires a decrease in ina-
tion and a positive cost push shock requires an increase in ination. Because
of rational expectations we have a similar result for expected ination.
The optimal level of ination can be implemented by the Central Bank by
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setting the nominal interest rate. The interest rate rule can be obtained
by substituting (59), (61) and (62) into the IS curve (50), in which case we
obtain:
r^t =  

1 +

1  a
a

1  




aa

  a

+  (1  a)

at+
+

1 +

1  w
w

1  




aw

  w

wrt (63)
We can therefore state
Result 2. Under discretion an optimal monetary policy requires a de-
crease in the nominal interest rate following a positive productivity shock and
an increase in the nominal interest rate following a positive reservation wage
shock.
An interest rate rule that implements such optimal policy, can be found using
(??) and (62). In this case we obtain:
r^t =

1 +

1  w
w

1  



Ett+1 +

1 +
(w   a)
w (1  a)
a

  a
1  


r^et :
(64)
In Appendix A6 we show that under rule (64) equilibrium is determinate.
Assuming, as a particular case a = w = ; equation (64) becomes
r^t =

1 +

1  


1  



Ett+1 + r^
e
t (65)
We can now state:
Result 3. Optimal monetary policy under discretion requires a more than
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proportional increase in the nominal interest rate following an increase in
the expected rate of ination. However, an increase in the rate of interest
that support the e¢ cient equilibrium implies a proportional increase in the
nominal interest rate if and only if a = w = 1. Otherwise an increase in
r^et implies a more than proportional increase in the nominal interest rate if
w > a and a less than proportional increase if w < a:
Result 3 is quite interesting. As in the standard DSNK model, optimality re-
quires that the Central Bank respond to increasing inationary expectations
by raising more than proportionally nominal interest rates. In other words,
also for our unionized economy, the Taylor principle applies. The optimal
response of the nominal interest rate to an increase in the e¢ cient rate of
interest, instead, is di¤erent from the one that is usually obtained in the
standardDSNK model.
Notice that (57) and (56) together imply
ut =  (1  )a
2(
  a)
at +
(1  )a
2(
  w)
wrt : (66)
Given the log-linearization of equation (36), we can now state
Result 4. Under an optimal discretionary monetary policy a productivity
shock will induce a change in the rate of unemployment without a¤ecting the
real wage rate.
This result is quite important since it is consistent with a well known fact
in macroeconomics, i.e. the relatively smooth behavior of wages along the
business cycle together with the relatively volatile behavior of unemployment.
32
In this simple model, wages move only when there is a shock in the reservation
wages of households. Productivity shocks imply some degree of volatility in
unemployment while real wages remain constant. Wages, in the simple set
up we consider in this paper, are probably too rigid, as we assume that all
markets are unionized. Nevertheless, the model makes an interesting point,
i.e. that the behavior of monopoly unions, in itself, is able to generate a
dynamics of wages and unemployment that is roughly consistent with the
one typically observed in the real economy
4.2 Constrained Commitment
Let us assume that the Central Bank follows a rule for the target variable xt
which depends on the fundamental shocks wrt and r
n
t : In order to obtain an
analytical solution we assume the following feedback rule equation
xct = ! (at   wrt ) 8t (67)
and we also assume
a = w = 
where ! > 0 is the coe¢ cient of the feedback rule and the variable xct is the
value of xt conditional on commitment to the policy.
Before solving the Central Bank problem under constrained commitment, we
iterate forward the Phillips curve (54) obtaining:
ct =

1  1  

!

a
1   (w
r
t   at) (68)
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which, considering equation (67), gives , can be rewritten as:
ct = a
1  

1
1  x
c
t  
a
1   (at   w
r
t ) (69)
Notice that, in this case, a one percent contraction of xct reduces 
c
t by the
amount a 1 
1
1 w ; while under discretion, reducing xt by one percent only
produces a fall in t of a 1  < a
1 

1
1 w : As in the case analyzed by
Clarida, Galì and Gertler [8], the Central bank will enjoy an improved trade
o¤, due to the fact that commitment to a policy rule a¤ects expectations on
the future course of the output gap.
Given (67) and (68) we can now write the problem of the Central Bank under
constrained commitment as follows:
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY;t
2

(ct)
2 +
a

(xct)
2

Et
1X
i=0

wt+i   at+i
wrt   at
2
subject to equation (69). The rst order conditions imply:
xct =  
1  


1
1  
c
t (70)
Since 1 

 1
1  <
1 

 this implies that commitment to a rule makes it
optimal, for the central bank, to induce a greater contraction of output in
response to an increase in ination. Substituting (70) into the Phillips curve
and iterating forward we obtain:
t =   a

c (1  ) (at   w
r
t ) (71)
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and
Ett+1 =   a

c (1  a)
(at   wrt ) (72)
where 
c = 1+

1 

1
1 
2
 > 
: The interest rate rule can be obtained
by substituting (70), (71) and (72) into the IS curve (50), in which case we
obtain:
rct =  

1 +

1  


1  



1  

a

c (1  )

+  (1  )

at+
+

1 +

1  


1  



1  

a

c (1  )

wrt (73)
Using equation (70), the one of the Phillips curve and the one of the IS-curve
we nd the following optimal instrument rule:
r^ct =

1 +

1  


1  


1  

Ett+1 + r^
e
t : (74)
Since 1
1  > 1, we have the following
Result 4. Under commitment to a simple feedback rule, when a = w =
; an optimal interest rule requires that, in reacting to an increase in expected
ination, the nominal interest rate must be increased more than in the case
of discretion .
5 Calibration
In order to illustrate the qualitative properties of our model we analyze the
responses of the output gap, ination and the nominal interest rate to a
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productivity shock and a reservation wage shock. We start by the discussing
our calibration of the model parameters, summarized in table 1.
We take each period to correspond to a quarter. For the parameters describ-
ing preferences, we set, as in Ma¤ezzoli [25] the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution  = 2: The output elasticity of labor,  = 0:72; is based on the
estimate of Christo¤el et al. [10]. The discount factor ; the Calvo parame-
ter '; and the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods  are set
at values commonly found in the literature ( for example in Galì [15]). In
particular we set  = 0:99; ' = 0:75; which implies an average price duration
of one year, and nally  = 11; which is consistent with a 10 percent markup
in the steady state. The persistence of the technology shock a and its stan-
dard deviation a are set as in Amato and Laubach [3], i.e. a = :93 and
a = 0:687: The persistence of the wage shock and its standard deviation
are assumed to be as the persistence of a cost-push shock and its standard
deviation, i.e., equal to 0.7 and 0.07, as estimated by Ireland [23]. As in
Ma¤ezzoli [25] N = 0:62:
In gure (1), (2), (3) and (4) we consider the e¤ect of a one standard de-
viation, negative productivity shock on the nominal interest rate, ination,
the output gap and the rate of unemployment under di¤erent types of mon-
etary policy. Under a policy aimed at stabilizing output, which we obtain
by setting xt = 0, a negative productivity shock will imply an increase in
the nominal interest rate by more that 0.2 percentage points and will have a
very large e¤ect on the rate of ination, that will initially increase by almost
0.15 per cent. Under a policy aimed at stabilizing ination, i.e. a policy
achieved by setting t = 0, a productivity shock will imply a much smaller
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response of the interest rate, which will initially increase by 0.22 percentage
points. The output gap will increase by 1.7 percentage points and the rate
of unemployment will fall by almost 4 percentage points.
As we could expect, the optimal policy under discretion, which is de-
scribed in gure (3), stirs an intermediate course between these two extreme
policies. A negative productivity shock will require an increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate of 0.2% and an increase in ination of almost 0.1%. Initially
output will fall by 0.7% and the rate of unemployment will have an initial in-
crease of about 1.5 percentage points. An optimal monetary policy, therefore,
will take into account the trade-o¤ that exists between ination stabilization
and output stabilization: as a response to a productivity shock output will
decrease less than in the extreme ination targeting case and ination will
also increase less than in the policy aimed at fully stabilizing output and
unemployment.
In gure (4) we report the results of an exercise aimed at replicating
the optimal policy through a simple Taylor rule. We found that a rule that
approximates quite well the optimal monetary policy (i.e. that achieves a
response of the major variables quite close to the one achieved by our economy
under the optimal discretional monetary policy) is given by
it = 2:5t + 0:05xt (75)
Notice that this rule implies a stronger response to ination and a weaker
response to the output gap than the ones found in the literature. Clarida
Galì and Gertler [8] for the U.S. economy in the Volcker-Greenspan era,
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for example, found a response to ination equal to 2:15 and a response to
unemployment equal to 0:93 . Smets and Wouters [37] for the European
economy found a response to ination equal to 1:658 and a response to output
of 0:145:
In gure (5)-(8) we show the responses of the interest rate, output and
unemployment to a one standard deviation shock to the reservation wage.
The responses are quite similar to those obtained for the negative produc-
tivity shock although, given the smaller persistence of the wage shock, the
e¤ect lasts for fewer quarters.
6 Conclusions
We have considered in this paper a DSNK model where labor is indivisible
and where wages are set by monopoly unions. We found that, with respect to
the standard DSNK framework, our model gives a more satisfactory descrip-
tion of the reality of modern industrialized economy, especially of those where
collective bargaining dominates the labor market. In a unionized economy,
signicant trade-o¤s between stabilizing ination and stabilizing unemploy-
ment arise, in response to technology and exogenous wage shocks. Because
of real wage rigidity, an optimizing central bank must respond to negative
(positive) technology shocks by increasing (decreasing) the interest rate and,
similarly, must respond to exogenous increases in unionsreservation wage
with an interest rate increase. Interestingly, if we consider an optimal in-
strument rule, an optimizing central bank not only will increase the interest
rate more than proportionately in response to an increase in future expected
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ination, but will also react to increases in the rate of interest supporting the
e¢ cient equilibrium that are not necessarily one to one. The model is also
capable of accounting for the greater volatility of unemployment relative to
the wage volatility that is usually found in the data.
Even though we think that the model represents a step forward in the
analysis of optimal monetary policy of contemporary economies, we are aware
that it gives a representation of the working of the labor market which is still
quite crude. For the sake of simplicity, many other market imperfections,
like search and matching costs and ring costs are absent. Moreover, the
model assumes that the whole labor market is unionized. A more realistic
representation of the challenges provided to monetary policy by di¤erent in-
stitutional settings in the labor market would imply considering, for example,
a two sector model where only a fraction of workers belong to unions and are
covered by collective agreements. We leave however these challenges to our
future research.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 The Ramsey Problem
We consider a social planner which maximizes the representative household
utility subject to the economy resource constraint and production function
as follows:
max
Nt
U (Ct; Nt) =
1
1  C
1 
t  (Nt)
1  (A1)
s:t: (A2)
Ct = Yt (A3)
Yt = AtN

t
Substituting the constraint into the utility function the problem is:
max
N
1
1   (AtN

t )
1   (Nt)
1  (A4)
the rst order condition requires
(AtN

t )
  
Yt
Nt
 (Nt)
1  =   (AtNt )1   (Nt)  N (Nt) (A5)
simplifying
Yt
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
=   Yt
Nt
(A6)
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Multiplying both sides of equation for Nt
Yt
we nd
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
Nt =   (A7)
and
UN
UC
Nt
Yt
=
N (Nt)
 (Nt)
Nt =   (A8)
A.2 Derivation of the E¢ cient Output
We consider the Ramsey solution (A17)
N (Nt)Nt =   (Nt) (A9)
in order to nd an equation for the e¢ cient output we rst log-linearizing
equation (A9) around the steady state, which implies
[N (N) + NN (N)Nnt]N (1 + nt) =   ( (N) + N (N)Nnt) (A10)
which can be rewritten as
N (N)N+N (N)Nnt+NN (N)N
2nt =   ( (N) + N (N)Nnt) (A11)
Considering the steady state equation
N (N)Nt =   (N) (A12)
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and collecting terms in nt we obtain 
1 +
N (N)Nt
 (N)
+
NN (N)N
2
 (N)

N (N)Nt
 (N)
 1!
nt = 0 (A13)
given that 1 + N (N)Nt
(N)
+ NN (N)N
2
(N)

N (N)Nt
(N)
 1
6= 0 we require,
nt = 0 (A14)
and then from the aggregate production function we obtain equation (24) in
the text.
A.3 Derivation of the Flexible Price Equilibrium Out-
put in the Walrasian Model
Let us rewrite equation (25) as:
N (Nt)Nt =  

(1  )MCt (Nt) (A15)
at the steady state becomes,
N (N)N =  
1
(1  )MC (N) (A16)
Then log-linearizing,
[N (N) + NN (N)Nnt]N (1 + nt) =  
MC
(1  ) (1 +mct) [ (N) + N (N)Nnt]
(A17)
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considering the steady state equation (A16) we have,
mct =

1 +
N (N)N
 (N)
+
NN (N)N
2
 (N)

nt (A18)
given equation (A14) and considering the aggregate production function
we obtain equation (28) in the text.
A.4 Derivation of the Phillips Curve
Following Calvo [6] we assume that each rm may reset its price with prob-
ability 1 ' each period, independently from the time elapsed since the last
adjustment. This means that each period a measure 1 ' of rms reset their
price, while a fraction ' of them keep their price unchanged. The law of
motion of the aggregate price is given by:
lnPt = ' lnPt 1 + (1  ') lnP t (A19)
which implies
t = (1  ') ln

pt
Pt 1

(A20)
where lnP t denotes the (log) price set by a rm i adjusting its price in period
t: Under Calvo [6] price-setting structure pt+k (i) = pt with probability '
k
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::; hence rms have to be forward-looking.
Given that the individual rm technology is characterized by decreasing
return to scale, the optimal price setting rule should take into account that
marginal cost is no longer common across rms. In particular, in the neigh-
borhood of the zero ination steady state, we have the following price-setting
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rule:
lnP t (i) = 
P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

mcnt;t+k
	
(A21)
where mcnt;t+k is the log-linearized nominal marginal cost in period t + k of
a rm which last set its price in period t: Considering the equation of real
marginal cost and the one of the aggregate production function,
MCt;t+k = (1  ) (Wt+k=Pt+k)
 (Yt;t+k=Nt;t+k)
= MCt+k
(Yt+k=Nt+k)
(Yt;t+k=Nt;t+k)
= MCt+k

Yt+k
Yt;t+k
 1 

= MCt+k

P t
Pt+k
 1 

(A22)
taking the logs
lnMCt;t+k = lnMCt+k   1  

ln

P t
Pt+k

(A23)
Considering that all rms resetting prices in period t will choose the same
price P+t we can rewrite equation (A21) as,
ln

P t (i)
Pt 1

= P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

lnMCnt;t+k   lnPt 1
	
= P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

lnMCnt;t+k
	
+
+
1X
k=0
(')k ft+kg (A24)
49
substituting equation (A5) which can be rewritten as
ln

P t (i)
Pt 1

= P + (1  ')
1X
k=0
(')k Et

lnMCnt;t+k   
1  

ln

P t
Pt+k

+
1X
k=0
(')k ft+kg (A25)
then
lnP t (i)  lnPt 1 = P + 'Et

lnP t+1   lnPt
	
+ (1  ') lnMCt (A26)
Combining (A26) with (A19) we obtain
t = Ett+1 + mct (A27)
as in the text.
A.5 The Welfare-Based Loss Function
A second-order Taylor expansion of the period utility around the e¢ cient
equilibrium yields,
Ut = Ut + U C;t Ct ~Ct +
1
2
U C C;t C
2
t
~C2t +
U N;t Nt ~Nt +
1
2
U N N;t N
2
t
~N2t +
+ U C N;t Ct Nt ~Ct ~Nt +
 kk3 (A28)
where the generic ~X = ln
 
X= Xt

denotes log-deviations from the e¢ cient
equilibrium and Xt denotes the value of the variable under e¢ cient equilib-
rium. Moreover, we denote as xt = ln

Xt
X

:
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Considering the exible prices economy resource constraint,
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t Yt ~Yt +
1
2
U Y Y ;t Y
2
t
~Y 2t +
U N;t Nt ~Nt +
1
2
U N N;t N
2
t
~N2t +
+U Y N;t Yt Nt ~Yt ~Nt +
 kk3 (A29)
Collecting terms yields
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t Yt
264 ~Yt + U N;t NtU Y ;t Yt ~Nt + 12 U Y Y ;tU Y ;t Yt ~Y 2t +
+1
2
U N N;t
N2t
U Y ;t
Yt
~N2t +
U Y N;t
Nt
U Y ;t
~Yt ~Nt
375+  kk3 (A30)
Considering that,
U Y N;t
Nt
U Y ;t
=
 N;t( Nt) Nt
( Nt)
=   (1  ); we have,
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t Yt
2664
~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t + (1  )
N( Nt)
( Nt)
Nt ~Yt ~Nt
+1
2
"
NN( Nt)
( Nt)
  

N( Nt)
( Nt)
2#
N2t
~N2t
3775+  kk3
(A31)
It can be shown that
NN;t( Nt)
( Nt)
= 2 1


N( Nt)
( Nt)
2
; hence
Ut = Ut + U Y ;t Yt
2664
~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t + (1  )
N( Nt)
( Nt)
Nt ~Yt ~Nt
+1
2
" 
2 1

  N( Nt)
( Nt)
2#
N2t
~N2t
3775+  kk3
(A32)
Ut = Ut+ U Y ;t Yt
264 ~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t   (1  ) ~Yt ~Nt+
+1
2
 
2 1

  2 ~N2t
375+  kk3 (A33)
We now take a rst-order expansion of the term U Y ;t Yt around the steady
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state.
U Y ;t Yt = UY

1 + (1  ) yt + (1  ) N (N)
 (N)
N nt

+  kk2
= UY (1 + (1  ) yt   (1  )nt) +
 kk2 (A34)
N
 
Nt


 
Nt
 Nt = N (N)
 (N)
N +  nnt ++
 kk2 (A35)
where  n =

N (N)N
(N)
+ NN (N)N
2
(N)
  N (N)2N2
(N)2

 
N
 
Nt

Nt

 
Nt
 !2 = N (N)N2
 (N)
2
+ nnt +
 kk2 (A36)
where n = 2

N (N)NN (N)N
(N)2
+

N (N)N
(N)
2
 

N (N)
(N)
3
N

given that nt = 0; and that
N (N)N
(N)
=  ; substituting (A35) and (A36) into
the Welfare function,
Ut = Ut+UY (1 + (1  ) yt)
264 ~Yt    ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t    (1  ) ~Yt ~Nt
+1
2
 
2 1

  2 ~N2t
375+  kk3
(A37)
Given the aggregate production function and that the log-deviations of the
price dispersion index  dt = ~Yt    ~Nt are of second-order, and that:
~Y 2t = 
2 ~N2t nt ~Nt = nt ~Yt yt ~Nt = yt ~Yt ~Yt ~Nt = ~Y
2
t
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considering only terms up to the second-order we have:
Ut = Ut + UY
264 ~Yt   ~Nt   2 ~Y 2t   (1  ) ~Y 2t
+1
2
 
2 1

   ~Y 2t
375+  kk3 (A38)
~Ut  Ut   Ut =  UY

dt +
1
2

2   1

  2

~Y 2t

+  kk3
= Ut   Ut =  UY

dt   1
2
~Y 2t

+  kk3 (A39)
As proven by Galì and Monacelli [18], the log-index of the relative-price
distortion is of second-order and proportional to the variance of prices across
rms, which implies that:
dt = ln
"Z 1
0

Pt (j)
Pt
  

dj
#
=

2
vari

pt (i) +
 kk3	 (A40)
proof Galì and Monacelli [18].
As shown in Woodford [36], this means that
1X
t=0
tvari fpt (i)g = 1
a
1X
t=0
t2t (A41)
where  = (1   ) (1   ) = :
Finally, denoting the output gap ~Yt as in the standard way xt; theWelfare-
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Based loss-function can be written as,
Wt = Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY
2
Et
1X
t=0


a
2t+k +
1

xt+k

+  kk3
= Et
1X
t=0
t ~Ut+k =  UY
2
Et
1X
t=0


a
2t+k +
1

xt+k

+  kk3 (A42)
A.6 Stability and Determinacy in the Reduced Form
Dynamic System
Our model can be expressed in the following reduced form:
xt = Etxt+1   [rt   Ett+1   r^nt ] (A43)
t = Ett+1 + a
1  

xt +
a
 (1  a)
r^nt + aw
r
t (A44)
the model is completed adding the optimal instrument rule interest rate
which, under discretion is given by:
r^t = Ett+1 + rr^
n
t (A45)
where  = 1 +

1 w
w

1 

 and r = 1 +
(a w)
(1 a)


 a :
In order to verify if the optimal policy can guarantee the uniqueness of
the equilibrium we combine the IS the AS and the optimal interest rate with
the natural interest rate equation, so that we can write the following reduced
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dynamic system:
xt = Etxt+1 + (1  )Ett+1 + (1  r) rnt (A46)
t = a
1  

Etxt+1 +

a
1  

(1  ) + 

Ett+1 +
+

1 +
a
 (1  a)
  r

rnt + aw
r
t (A47)
which can be rewritten as
$t = A1Et$t+1 + A2ut (A48)
where$t = Et [xt; t]
T andAT2 =
264 1  r 0
1 + 
(1 a)   r a
375 ; ut = [rnt ; wrt ]T
while the transition matrix is given by:
A1 =
264 1 1  
a
1 

a
1 

(1  ) + 
375 (A49)
Given that $t is a 2-vector of non-predetermined endogenous variable,
rational expectation equilibrium is determinate if and only if the matrix A1
has both eigen values outside the unit circle, which occurs if and only if13:
detA1 < 1; (A50)
j trA1j < 1 + detA1: (A51)
13See Proposition 1 in the Appendix of Woodford [36].
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Notice that, in our case:
detA1 = a
1  

(1  ) +    a1  

(1  ) =  < 1 (A52)
j trA1j = 1 + a1  

(1  ) +  < 1 +  given that  > 1 (A53)
which implies that the rational expectations equilibrium of our model under
an optimal discretionary policy is determinate.
The optimal instrument rule commitment is given by:
r^ct = 
c
Ett+1 + 
c
rr^
n
t (A54)
where c = 1 +

1 



1 

1  and 
c
r = 1:
Under commitment matrix A1 becomes:
A1 =
264 1 1  c
a
1 

a
1 

(1  c) + 
375 (A55)
Notice that
detA1 = a
1  

(1  c) +    a
1  

(1  c) =  < 1 (A56)
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j trA1j = 1 + a1  

(1  c) +  < 1 +  given that c > 1 (A57)
which implies that also under constrained commitment the optimal inter-
est rule can guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.
Parameters value Description
 0.99 Discount factor
 2 Coe¢ cient of relative risk adversion
 11 Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods
 0.72 Output elasticity to labor input
' 0.75 Probability of goods price non-adjustment
w 0.7 Persistence of the reservation wage shock
w 0.07 Standard deviation of the reservation wage shock
a 0.93 Persistence of the reservation productivity shock
a 0.867 Standard deviation of the reservation productivity shock
N 0.61 Steady state employment
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Figure 1: IRFs to a negative productivity shocks under constant output
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Figure 2: IRFs to a negative productivity shock under constant ination
59
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
pgreco
10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
re
10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
i
10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
u
10 20 30 40
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
x
Figure 3: IRFs to a negative technology shock under the optimal interest
rate rule
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Figure 4: IRFs to a negative productivity shock under a simple Taylor Rule
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Figure 5: IRFs to a positive reservation wage shock under a constant output
rule
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Figure 6: IRFs to a positive reservation wage shock under a constant ination
rule
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Figure 7: IRFs to a positive reservation wage shock under the optimal interst
rate rule
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Figure 8: IRfs to a positive reservation wage shock under a simple Taylor
rule
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